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Brexit, and the recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in Miller,1 has subjected the British 
constitution to unprecedented public scrutiny, thus resulting in a yearning for greater 
understanding of the constitution and its key tenets.  However, the British constitution, because 
of its evolutionary nature, is both uncodified and unentrenched, thus making it highly 
contested.  A complete picture of the debate surrounding the meaning of the British constitution 
cannot be obtained, therefore, without first understanding the competing models of British 
constitutionalism: the legal, common law and political.   
 Legal constitutionalism seeks to adopt a codified and entrenched constitution for Britain 
whereby the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is abandoned and the courts are capable of 
enforcing the constitution, in particular fundamental rights, against the legislature.  Common 
law constitutionalists seek to achieve the same result but via the English common law rather 
than a written and entrenched constitution.  Political constitutionalists, by contrast, seek instead 
to defend the British constitution against calls for change.   
 As will be briefly shown, all three models have their conceptual origins in the seventeenth 
century, but were pioneered chiefly in response to the constitutional changes of the last half-
century, in particular British membership of the European Union and the New Labour reform 
package, which included the Human Rights Act 1998 and devolution to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.  It is submitted, however, that Brexit, and the potential of a UK collapse, has 
given new relevance and meaning to this debate, and a better understanding of it may help us 
to navigate the constitutional challenges which still lie ahead.       
 Whilst each model has its advocates and critics, many writers have only engaged with the 
debate passively whilst examining other constitutional matters.  The few direct commentaries 
on the subject are largely restricted to the study of an individual model only.  Critically, each 
competing model is itself open to dispute, with both proponents and opponents of each model 
                                                     
 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer and to Adelyn Wilson and Mike Radford for their comments on an 
earlier draft. 
1 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
Robert Brett Taylor 
 
Page 2 of 23 
 
offering similar but nevertheless different accounts.2  Scholars also popularly characterise the 
debate “for the very heart and soul of the British constitution”3 as one of law versus politics: 
should government be controlled by law in the court room (a legal constitution), or by politics 
within Parliament (a political constitution)?  Although this tension is a critical aspect of the 
debate surrounding the contemporary constitution, the distinction is nevertheless distracting, 
and fails in particular to draw a precise distinction between the legal and the common law 
constitution, which are instead often bundled together as one. 
 The principal purpose of this article, therefore, is to critically analyse the debate 
surrounding the meaning of the British constitution, with a particular focus on the requirements 
and claims of each competing model of constitutionalism.  The first part of this article will 
discuss the substantive claims of the three main competing models of British constitutionalism.  
Whilst the contested nature of each model will be acknowledged, the article will nevertheless 
identify their common themes and principles, thus bringing greater precision and clarity to the 
differences between the various competing schools.  In particular, it will seek to draw a sharper 
distinction between the legal and the common law models.  The final part will briefly examine 
the claims of each school collectively and demonstrate that the differences between the models 
are more nuanced than is often credited.  In so doing, it will be shown that none of the 
competing models provide a complete and accurate picture of the contemporary British 
constitution.  The true nature of the constitution is only apparent once the differences between 
the competing models are reconciled and we accept a gestalt understanding of the constitution: 
complementary constitutionalism.     
 




Legal constitutionalism developed in opposition to the system of legislative supremacy 
prevalent in the United Kingdom by the late-eighteenth century, and is frequently viewed as its 
opposite.4  It is also closely related to seventeenth century social contract theory which helped 
spark the process of global constitution-making during the Age of Enlightenment.   
 Our modern understanding of social contract theory emerged originally in seventeenth 
century England as a consequence of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms.  Although 
contractarianism is subject to much theoretical variation, the core idea (as advanced by Thomas 
Hobbes,5 John Locke,6 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau7) is that the people, in exchange for certain 
collective benefits, give up some of their power in order to form government and ensure public 
order.8  For Locke, citizens’ obedience to the law was conditional on the state not interfering 
                                                     
2 In agreement see M. Elliott and R. Thomas, Public Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.37. 
3 R.B. Taylor, “Foundational and regulatory conventions: exploring the constitutional significance of Britain’s 
heavy dependency upon conventions” (2015) P.L. 614. 
4 See especially C.H. McIlwain, “The English Common Law, Barrier Against Absolutism” The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Oct., 1943), 23-31.   
5 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
6 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
7 J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., Everyman’s Library, 1963). 
8 R. Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.146. 
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with three fundamental natural rights: Life, Liberty and Estate.  Interference voids the contract, 
and the people can then revolt.9  Although these constraints upon the state envisaged by Locke 
were largely moral in character, they were translated by Thomas Paine into the language of 
law. 
 Basing his hypothesis upon the recently enacted constitution of the US (one of the first to 
be produced in light of John Locke’s liberal theory) and rejecting the descriptive definition of 
a constitution utilised in late-seventeenth century England, Paine argued that “[i]t is not 
sufficient that we adopt the word [constitution]; we must fix also a standard significance to 
it”.10  For Paine, this “standard significance” consisted of a number of criteria for identifying a 
true constitution.11  Crucially, a “constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but 
of a people constituting a government”.12  Paine also proposed that a constitution must be 
prescriptive in nature, and in creating government, also defined and so limited its authority.13  
It was also implied that the constitution must be contained within a single document.14  As 
Paine noted, “[a] constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact.  It has not an ideal, but a 
real existence; and whenever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none”.15  As a 
result, the social contract became the written constitution, a high-status contract between the 
government and the governed,16 and natural rights became legal civil rights.17 
 The constitution is therefore entrenched “higher law” that is “superior to other laws”18 and 
incapable of change other than by constitutional amendment.  Constitutional rights act as 
substantive constraints upon legislative and executive powers.19  Since the Enlightenment, the 
rights commonly protected by such legal constitutions have steadily evolved and expanded and 
now overlap with human rights.  The protection of human rights is now a widely accepted 
cornerstone of the legal constitution, as well as of the substantive theory of the Rule of Law.20  
Fundamental to both, is not merely the inclusion of human rights as part of the “higher law” of 
the constitution, but their protection and enforcement by an empowered judiciary.21  Although 
                                                     
9 See T. Stanton, “Authority and Freedom in the Interpretation of Locke's Political Theory” (2011) 39(1) Political 
Theory 6; J.W. Tate, “Locke, God, and Civil Society: Response to Stanton” (2012) 40(2) Political Theory 222. 
10 T. Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
p.122.  See also M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 
p.8. 
11 See also F.F. Ridley, “There is no British constitution: a dangerous case of the Emperor's clothes” (1988) 41(3) 
Parliamentary Affairs 340, 342-343.  Ridley identifies four fundamental characteristics of a constitution that are 
consistent with those identified by Paine. See also C.H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1947), pp.1-2. 
12 Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings (1998), p.122.   
13 Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings (1998), pp.122-123. 
14 McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (1947), p.2. 
15 Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings (1998), p.122. 
16 See A. Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.5-6. 
17 Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings (1998), p.119. 
18 Ridley, “There is no British constitution: a dangerous case of the Emperor's clothes” (1988) 41(3) Parliamentary 
Affairs 340, 343. 
19 J.E.K. Murkens, “The quest for constitutionalism in UK public law discourse” (2009) 29(3) O.J.L.S. 427, 451. 
20 See P.P. Craig, “Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework” (1997) P.L. 
467. 
21 See Ridley, “There is no British constitution: a dangerous case of the Emperor's clothes” (1988) 41(3) 
Parliamentary Affairs 340, 343, 345, 353.  Ridley suggests a strong affinity for the protection of human rights 
under an entrenched bill of rights, although does not identify it as one of the four named fundamental 
characteristics. 
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the US Constitution, an early example of a legal constitution, was silent on the issue of 
constitutional review (the power of the courts to declare null legislative or executive acts 
deemed inconsistent with the constitution), it was subsequently claimed by the US Supreme 
Court in Marbury v Madison by way of constitutional interpretation.22  An empowered 
judiciary has since become one of the most significant mechanisms for the protection of 
fundamental rights globally,23 especially after the Second World War.24 
 Broadly speaking, it is submitted that legal constitutionalism can therefore be seen to 
advance three claims.  First, that the constitution is codified, entrenched “higher law” enacted 
by the people.  It is therefore antecedent to government, and imposes formal and substantive 
limits upon its power.  Secondly, that the substantive constraints upon governmental power 
should take the form primarily, but not exclusively, of human rights guarantees.  Thirdly, that 
the courts must have the power to review the constitutionality of both executive and legislative 
acts, normally necessitating a power of judicial strike down. 
 Legal constitutionalism, although subject to some variation in practice, is the dominant 
model of constitutionalism globally.  Following both the Second World War and the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, many nations now have a written, codified constitution, often accorded 
special legal status under the protection of an empowered judiciary.  Unlike both common law 
and political constitutionalism outlined below, legal constitutionalism, in particular the notion 
of a written antecedent document known as a “constitution”, has little historical basis in Britain, 
with the tentative exception perhaps of the mid-seventeenth century republic.25  It was, as noted 
above, developed largely in opposition to Britain’s constitutional arrangements, and is 
therefore best viewed an external model of constitutionalism.  As a result, Britain does not 
currently possess a legal constitution as defined above.  In the British context, therefore, legal 
constitutionalism, as distinct from common law constitutionalism discussed below, advocates 
the adoption of a codified and entrenched constitution for Britain. 
 Despite Britain not possessing a legal constitution per se, the cumulative impact of the 
New Labour reforms to the constitution in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries 
has persuaded leading constitutional scholar Vernon Bogdanor to proclaim that the orthodox 
constitution is now in the process of being replaced by a new, more legal constitution.  As 
Bogdanor notes, “[w]e are now in transition from a system based on parliamentary sovereignty 
to one based on the sovereignty of a constitution, albeit a constitution that is inchoate, indistinct 
and still in large part uncodified”.26  Membership of the European Union, the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and devolution have all empowered the judiciary in a manner more akin to a legal 
rather than a political constitution, albeit still subject to parliamentary supremacy.  The impact 
of these constitutional changes, however, is subject to ongoing disagreement.  Even if the 
constitution has or is becoming more legal as a result, thus no doubt quelling the demands of 
                                                     
22 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
23 H.M. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), p.115. 
24 E.M. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.19. 
25 Cf. A. Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2015). 
26 V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp.xi-xiii.  
In support, see T.R. Hickman, “In Defence of the Legal Constitution” (2005) 55(4) University of Toronto Law 
Journal 981. 
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some legal constitutionalists for more far-reaching reform, it is submitted that these changes 
have not silenced calls for the adoption of a formal legal constitution. 
 Following the twentieth century rise in legal constitutions globally, British lawyers and 
lay persons alike increasingly came to view such constitutional arrangements as essential for 
securing limited government, the very essence of what has become known as constitutionalism: 
a normative political doctrine that “denotes a type of political regime constructed in accordance 
with certain principles or ideals, which principles or ideals are judged to be good in themselves 
and against which a given constitutional regime’s performance can be, and ought to be, 
judged”.27  Although Dicey asserted that individual liberty was guaranteed under the 
constitution by virtue of the Rule of Law,28 the dominance of Diceyan thinking throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century (a supposed “golden age of liberty”29) is now widely seen to 
have instilled a culture of judicial deference towards executive discretion that was maintained 
even at the expense of personal liberty.30  The human rights of individuals, therefore, as well 
as the entire structure of governance, are seen to be at risk from tyrannical governments, which 
may exercise wide discretionary powers free from legal accountability.   As Anthony W. 
Bradley et al therefore note, “[e]ver since the American and French revolutions, it has become 
clear that a parliamentary majority may not be a bulwark of constitutionalism so much as a 
challenge to it”.31 
 Academic works on the British constitution have therefore become increasingly critical of 
its key tenets,32 primarily the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the fusion of powers, 
on the grounds that such institutional arrangements invite what Lord Hailsham in 1976 
described as “elective dictatorship”.33  As F.F. Ridley, a leading legal constitutionalist, 
famously declared in his 1988 article, “the term British constitution is near meaningless”,34 
because it fails satisfy his four fundamental (and inherently legal) requirements of a 
constitution.35  According to Ridley, majority government, coupled with the absence of any 
substantive limits on Parliament’s supremacy, results in an inherently undemocratic 
constitutional order where fundamental constitutional change can occur unchecked.36 
 Since Ridley’s article, calls for the adoption of a written and entrenched constitution in 
Britain have grown, particularly in the wake of both referendums on Scottish independence 
and EU membership.  One notable contemporary advocate is Andrew Blick, who has made a 
                                                     
27 A. King, The British Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.10-11.  See also A. Sajó, Limiting 
Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Budapest: Central European Press, 1999), p.9. 
28 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [1915] (8th edn, London: Macmillan and 
Co., Ltd., 1923), Chapter IV. 
29 K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain 
1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.v. 
30 See Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain 1914-
1945 (2000), generally. 
31 K.S. Ziegler, D. Baranger and A.W. Bradley (eds), Constitutionalism and the Role of Parliaments (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007), p.7. 
32 See Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (1998), generally 
33 Lord Hailsham expressed this view in a Richard Dimbleby lecture for the BBC on 14th October 1976.  
34 Ridley, “There is no British constitution: a dangerous case of the Emperor's clothes” (1988) 41(3) Parliamentary 
Affairs 340, 359. 
35 Ridley, “There is no British constitution: a dangerous case of the Emperor's clothes” (1988) 41(3) Parliamentary 
Affairs 340, 342-343. 
36 Ridley, “There is no British constitution: a dangerous case of the Emperor's clothes” (1988) 41(3) Parliamentary 
Affairs 340, 360-361. 
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comprehensive case for the adoption of a written, legally entrenched constitution.  Blick sees 
the adoption of a written constitution as a solution to the turmoil surrounding the contemporary 
constitution, but one which would necessitate the abolition of parliamentary sovereignty as the 
doctrine “can threaten values important to the sustenance of a democratic system”.37  He thus 
argues that “[c]ertain principles, such as human right and the position of the nations of the UK, 
should not be negotiable.”38  Sovereignty would thus switch from Parliament to the written text 
of the constitution,39 protected, unsurprisingly, by an empowered judiciary.40 
 Far from seeing the adoption of a legal constitution as a departure from British 
constitutional history, Blick in fact argues that England has a long tradition of adopting written 
constitutional documents,41 predating even the Magna Carta of 1215, thus providing some 
historical justification for adopting a written constitution today.  As he notes, “[c]onfounding 
popular views, the concept of a written constitution has an important basis in our historic 
thought and practice.  It would not be a foreign imposition”.42  In so doing, Blick challenges 
the orthodox account of British constitutional history as being both free from external influence 
and continuous in nature, citing in particular 1707 as a break in the constitution’s historic 
continuity.43       
 Despite these arguments, the demand for a written constitution remains uncertain.  Inspired 
by the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, the Political and Constitutional Reform Select 
Committee published a report setting out three options for codifying the constitution, one being 
the adoption of a written constitution.44  Following a public consultation, broad support for a 
codified or written constitution was revealed, but the Committee nevertheless stressed that 
there was no consensus on the issue.45      
 
Common law constitutionalism 
 
Conversely, some critics of the orthodox understanding of Britain’s constitution have, via the 
English common law, sought to reinterpret its key tenets to achieve compliance with the 
underlying aims of legal constitutionalism.  The common law constitution is the modern 
successor to the “ancient constitution” advanced in the seventeenth century, which viewed the 
common law as an archive of people’s rights and freedom dating back to time immemorial, 
thereby providing a basic constitutional framework from which government may legally 
operate.  One of its chief advocates, Sir Edward Coke, even went so far as to say in Dr 
Bonham’s case that the courts would invalidate any Act of Parliament which is “against 
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed”.46  
                                                     
37 Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (2015), p.289. 
38 Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (2015), p.291. 
39 Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (2015), p.281. 
40 Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (2015), p.278.  
41 Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (2015), p.23. 
42 Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (2015), p.225. 
43 Blick, Beyond Magna Carta: A Constitution for the United Kingdom (2015), p.285. 
44 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Second Report, A new Magna Carta? 
(2014-15), HC Paper No.463. 
45 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Seventh Report, Consultation on A new 
Magna Carta? (2014-15), HC Paper 599, pp.14 and 22. 
46 Dr Bonham’s case (1609) 8 Co Rep 107, at 118a per Coke, CJ. 
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 Although not far removed from its ancient counterpart, the common law constitution 
nevertheless remains a distinct model which, like the political constitution, has been shaped 
and informed by recent constitutional changes,47 and pioneered by contemporary writers.  
Despite the great commonality between these various writers as to the underlying assumptions 
of the common law constitution, however, there is still some disagreement over the model’s 
exact scope.  The two most prominent advocates of this uniquely British variant of the legal 
constitution are Sir John Laws and Trevor Allan,48 who offer distinct visions of common law 
constitutionalism.     
 The English common law can trace its origins back to the twelfth century and has, despite 
the rise of parliamentary sovereignty, played a major role in shaping the contemporary 
constitution ever since.  Laws therefore argues that “the unifying principle of our constitution 
is the common law”.49  He views the British constitution as a common law construct, including 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,50 which is sustained and limited by the common law. 
 The de facto subservience of Parliament to the common law is reflected strongly in Laws’ 
understanding of judicial review of executive action.  The basis of review under Laws’ common 
law constitution is deemed to be the common law itself, and not Parliament’s will as 
traditionally conceived under the ultra vires model of review.51  Laws rejects the ultra vires 
model of review as ‘a fiction’ on the grounds that the lawfulness of an executive decision may 
be determined by free-standing principles of the common law. 52  According to Laws, common 
law principles embody predominantly liberal values, which were developed over the centuries, 
not by Parliament, but by the courts.53  Laws also objects to the ultra vires model on the basis 
that it “implies a power in Parliament to override any restraining principle of civilised 
government; any fundamental constitutional protection which the common law might evolve 
for the protection of the people”.54  Significantly, this suggests that parliamentary sovereignty, 
because of its dependency upon the common law, may be subject to common law limits, the 
attempted breach of which, may enable the courts to override an Act of Parliament.       
 Crucially, however Laws does not state so explicitly, and refrains from making any serious 
normative case for the development of the common law in this direction.  Instead, Laws states 
that Coke’s dictum in Dr Bonham’s case is “[p]lainly … far from the modern law”,55 and 
characterises the idea of judicial disobedience of statute as a kind of “absolutism”, suggesting 
even that a judge, in disobeying a statute, breaks his judicial oath, and so must resign.56   
 The type of common law protections Laws might have in mind, it is submitted, can be seen 
in Thoburn, where Laws stated obiter that the common law now recognised a hierarchy of 
statutes whereby “constitutional” statutes would not, unlike “ordinary” statues, be subject to 
                                                     
47 See M. Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart: 
Oxford and Portland, 2015), p.126. 
48 In agreement see G. Gee and G.C.N. Webber, “What Is a Political Constitution?” (2010) 30(2) O.J.L.S. 1, 4. 
49 Sir J. Laws, The Common Law Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.3. 
50 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), p.11. 
51 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), pp.16-17, 20. 
52 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), p.17. 
53 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), p.3. 
54 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), p.17. 
55 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), p.11. 
56 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), pp.17-18. 
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implied repeal.57  Only express words could normally be used to repeal a constitutional statute 
or abrogate constitutional rights.58  According to Laws, this development is advantageous 
because “[i]t gives us most of the benefits of a written constitution, in which fundamental rights 
are accorded special respect.  But it preserves the sovereignty of the legislature and the 
flexibility of our uncodified constitution”.59  Although this partial entrenchment of 
constitutional statutes is subject to express words, thereby arguably preserving Parliament’s 
sovereignty as Laws seems to suggest, the common law on this reading has nevertheless 
succeeded in binding Parliament, something that Laws says Parliament is incapable of doing.60  
It is the common law, not Parliament, which recognises constitutional statutes.61  Parliament is 
therefore de facto subservient to the common law, and the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is subject, at the very least, to modification by the courts. 
 It is thus argued that Laws’ vision of the common law constitution is not one defined by 
the common law courts’ ability to override Parliament on matters of fundamental constitutional 
importance, but one where such an eventuality is actually avoidable.  In Laws’ eyes, all statute 
and government policy must pass through the common law courts, and in so doing, will be 
mediated to the people in line with common law rules of interpretation which are “as normative, 
as full of value, as any substantive legal principle”.62  Whilst the practical effect of this 
constructivist interpretative mechanism is that Parliament’s intention may not always be what 
is enforced, it is seen by Laws as a means by which a constitutional balance can be struck 
between Parliament and the courts.63  Mediating statute to the people, he argues, “provides as 
close a fit as possible between the policy of Parliament and values – reason, fairness and the 
presumption of liberty – which over time have come to reflect and moderate the temper of the 
people”.64  This avoids, it is submitted, a confrontation between the two, and by extension the 
necessity for a power of judicial strike down. 
 Laws’ vision of the common law constitution thus represents a significant departure from 
the orthodox British constitution, but Allan goes even further.  Allan’s vision of the common 
law constitution, as articulated across several publications, has developed chiefly in opposition 
to the Diceyan reading of the British constitution, as well as the political constitution outlined 
below, which he views as an “imperfect representation of what a liberal, democratic regime 
ought ideally to be”.65  Allan’s distrust of the orthodox British constitution arises from its 
attachment to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which, he claims, risks individuals’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms.66  According to Allan, the courts are better suited to 
                                                     
57 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 at [62]. 
58 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 at [63]. 
59 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 at [64]. 
60 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 at [59]. 
61 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 at [69]. 
62 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), pp.22.  See also p.3. 
63 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), p.18. 
64 Laws, The Common Law Constitution (2014), p.22. 
65 T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p.88. 
66 T.R.S. Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism” (1986) 44 C.L.J. 
111, 116.  
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upholding the fundamental rights of the constitution,67 and should be able to do so even 
contrary to legislative intention.68  Instead of advocating for the adoption of a legal constitution 
as outlined above, however, Allan seeks to reconcile parliamentary supremacy with the Rule 
of Law (a doctrine central to Allan’s account of the common law constitution) which he claims 
opens “our existing constitutional tradition … to a benign or congenial interpretation, capable 
in principle of inspiring loyalty and allegiance”.69   
 Allan views the Rule of Law as a “rule of reason” (a fusion of the principles of due process 
and equality) which amounts “to a basic requirement of justification, or condition of 
legitimacy”70 to which all decisions and laws should adhere to be considered valid, hence he 
uses the term interchangeably with the term “legality”.71  Defined broadly as “the sovereignty 
of the principle of liberty”,72 he equates the Rule of Law with the ideals of liberal 
constitutionalism, and the fundamental human rights implicit within, most notably “the basic 
liberties of thought, speech, conscience, and association”.73  Under Allan’s account, the Rule 
of Law transforms the common law into a de facto “higher law” constitution for Britain,74 
thereby providing the basis from which the courts may legitimately enforce fundamental 
human rights against both the executive and Parliament.   
 According to Allan, judicial commitment to democracy (in the form of legislation) is not 
unqualified, and will only extend to legislation which (in conformity with the requirements of 
the Rule of Law) adheres to “the outcome of a democratic process whose legitimacy is 
ultimately dependent on it respecting minimum standards of justice”.75  As with Laws’ vision 
of the common law constitution, Allan advocates a constructivist approach towards statutory 
interpretation by the courts.  “A wise judge”, he notes, “will be reluctant to accept at face value 
legislation which violates important civil right, and will strive to interpret it consistently with 
traditional (common law) values of individual liberty and autonomy”,76  thus affirming “both 
legislative supremacy and constitutional rights”.77  However, although this should similarly 
avoid the necessity for judicial strike down, Allan’s account of the common law constitution 
nevertheless goes further than Laws’, advancing under exceptional circumstances a de facto 
power of judicial disapplication of statute, thus endorsing Sir Edward Coke’s dictum in Dr 
Bonham’s case.78  Such exceptional circumstance would be where the effect of an Act of 
Parliament would be “the destruction of any recognizable form of democracy”.79  
                                                     
67 T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p.161. 
68 T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), p.282. 
69 Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (2013), p.9. 
70 Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (2001), p.2 
71 Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (2013), p.89. 
72 Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (2013), p.91. 
73 Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (2001), p.2 
74 Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (1993), p.4. 
75 Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (1993), p.12. 
76 Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (1993), p.13.  See also 
Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (2013), p.91. 
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 Allan’s willingness to concede such a power to the courts derives from the importance he 
attaches to compliance with the Rule of Law.  Because state compliance with fundamental 
rights is deemed paramount, Allan advocates a wide, largely unlimited jurisdiction for the 
courts.  He rejects outright any limits on the courts’ power of adjudication. 
 According to Allan, political questions, as advanced by political constitutionalists, are ones 
deemed “inherently unsuited to adjudication, either because judicial determination would usurp 
the proper democratic process, or because judicial qualification or adversarial legal procedures 
are inadequate or inappropriate to the task”.80  Laws does not tackle political questions under 
his hypothesis of the common law constitution, and acknowledges only that the power of the 
courts in interpreting statutes is one “which depends on restraint”, applicable mostly where 
Parliament has delegated powers to Ministers.81  Although Allan does not dispute the existence 
of political questions curtailing the scope of judicial review, he nevertheless objects to any 
principle of judicial deference which precludes legal analysis by the courts.  To understand 
legislative supremacy as requiring “unqualified judicial obedience to statute”, would erect “a 
(genuine) doctrine of political questions, or principle of non-justiciability, that violates the rule 
of law”.82  Instead, Allan argues that matters of deference arise as part of the “ordinary process 
of review”.83  Justiciability is not independent of the legal claim, but a necessary part of it.84  
For Allan, therefore, no legal matter is non-justiciable on principle.  Any deference must be 
determined as part of the court’s legal analysis of the case.   
 This rejection of any barriers to adjudication concerning political questions extends even 
to constitutional conventions, exposing them as an attempt to “limit the judicial role – 
excluding ‘political questions’ from the scope of constitutional adjudications”.85  Allan argues 
that conventions should not be excluded from judicial deliberations where relevant to the 
answering of a legal question,86 thus suggesting that they may be judicially enforced.  
 Because the common law constitution is conceived as a British variant on the legal 
constitution, it arguably advances the same substantive arguments as that of legal 
constitutionalism.  Whilst some are certainly reflected in Allan’s work, and to a lesser degree 
in Laws’, it is nevertheless submitted that the common law constitution marks a significant 
departure from legal constitutionalism, in particular with regards to its form, and can thus be 
seen to make three related but nevertheless distinct claims of its own.  First, that the British 
constitution is a common law construct developed over centuries.  Key principles, such as the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, are both sustained and limited by the common law.  The 
common law is the constitution.  Secondly, the common law embodies substantive values, 
including fundamental rights, which the courts must uphold.   Thirdly, this enforcement of 
common law rights is achieved principally by the adoption of a constructivist approach by 
judges towards legislation.  Although this should negate any need for judicial disapplication of 
statute, Allan’s model nevertheless endorses it in exceptional circumstances. 
                                                     
80 Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (2001), p.161. 
81 Laws, The Common Law Constitution, (2014), p.25. 
82 Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (2001), p.163. 
83 Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (2001), p.163. 
84 Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (2001), p.65. 
85 Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (2013), p.77. 
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 Given the common law constitution’s historical roots in the development of the common 
law itself, it is fair to say that its advocates contend that the UK has always been and remains 
a common law one.  There has certainly been greater judicial recognition recently of 
fundamental common law rights,87 and some judges in Jackson even suggested obiter that they 
may invalidate primary legislation under exceptional circumstances.88  For writers such as 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Adam Tomkins and Michael Gordon, however, the existence of the 
common law constitution is entirely fictitious.  Goldsworthy disputes the historical accuracy 
of England’s supposed golden age of civil liberty, stating categorically that there “never was 
such an age”.89  Tomkins argues that the “ancient” common law constitution of the seventeenth 
century failed to hold the Stuarts to account despite the many judicial opportunities to do so.  
Accordingly, Parliament had to intervene to control the King, ultimately developing 
parliamentary sovereignty.90  Gordon demonstrates, through a detailed analysis of nineteenth 
and twentieth century case law, that it is the supremacy of Parliament, not of the common law, 
which has prevailed.91 
 The decisions of the High Court and UK Supreme Court in Miller arguably reinforce this 
precedent further, with both stating categorically that parliamentary sovereignty was a 
fundamental constitutional principle.92  However, the Supreme Court also acknowledged the 
“constitutional character” of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972) as stated obiter 
by Laws in Thoburn, but failed to endorse explicitly his distinction between “constitutional” 
and “ordinary” statutes as the High Court did.93  The High Court’s conclusion that the ECA 
1972 is a ‘constitutional statute’ is reached by slightly different means to that of Laws in 
Thoburn.  There, as noted above, Laws argues that it is the common law which designates an 
Act as constitutional in nature, not Parliament.  In Miller, the High Court suggested that 
Parliament is deemed to have intended the ECA 1972 to be immune from implied repeal.  The 
partial entrenchment of the Act, therefore, takes the form of a common law presumption as to 
Parliamentary intention.  Because the Act is constitutional in nature, Parliament is presumed to 
have intended it to be subject to express repeal only.  Although arguably only a minor 
modification of Laws’ judgment in Thoburn, it crucially does not exclude Parliament in the 
way that the original judgment does.   
 It is unclear from the judgment of the Supreme Court whether their passive 
acknowledgment of the ECA 1972 as constitutional in character represents an endorsement of 
the High Court’s reasoning.  If so, it is no longer the case that the common law designates a 
statute as constitutional and thus immune from implied repeal.  Instead, Parliament is presumed 
under the common law to have intended this outcome, which is arguably more consistent with 
                                                     
87 See especially R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. 
88 R (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 at [102] (Lord Steyn); [104] (Lord 
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89 J. Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p.235.  See also J. Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press, 2010), Chapter 2. 
90 A. Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005), Chapter 3.  
91 Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (2015), pp.131-
137. 
92 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 at [43]; R (Miller) v Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) at [20]. 
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Laws’ overall claim that the common law mediates the laws of Parliament to the people in line 
with common law values.   
 Despite the Court’s seemingly strict endorsement of parliamentary supremacy, therefore, 
it may not spell the end of the common law constitution, but instead its partial acceptance, at 





Both legal and common law constitutionalism find fault with the orthodox understanding of 
British constitutionalism, particularly its adherence to parliamentary sovereignty at the expense 
of judicially-enforceable rights.  Political constitutionalism recasts these perceived 
constitutional weaknesses as strengths.  The origins of this constitutional model can be traced 
back to the work of J.A.G. Griffith in the 1970s.  Critical of calls for greater constitutional 
reform, Griffiths launched his renewed defence of the British constitution in the late-1970s 
when he provided the first real blueprint of what he called the “political constitution”.94   
 Griffith famously remarked that “law is not and cannot be a substitute for politics”, and 
that government by law instead of men was unattainable because written constitutions and Bills 
of Rights did little more than pass political decisions “out of the hands of politicians and into 
the hands of judges”.95  Griffith was a moral relativist who argued that people disagree over 
substantive questions of principle, thus rejecting the idea that some values were more deserving 
of legal protection and enforcement by the courts.96  He thus rejected the notion of universal 
human rights,97 characterising them instead as “political claims”.98  As a result, Griffith argued 
that the acceptance or rejection of “political claims” was better left to politicians rather than 
judges because politicians “are so much more vulnerable than judges and can be dismissed or 
at least made to suffer in their reputation”.99  Griffith thus expressed doubt over the 
effectiveness of judicially-enforced constitutions at curtailing authoritarianism, arguing that 
“the responsibility and accountability of our rulers should be real and not fictitious”.100 
 The legacy of Griffith’s account of the political constitution remains the subject of 
academic debate and analysis, in particular its supposed descriptivism.  Griffith famously 
declared that “the constitution is no more and no less than what happens”,101 thus suggesting 
that the political constitution was a mere description of the British constitution in practice, 
absent both normative principles and prescriptions.102  Thomas Poole and Graham Gee, 
however, view this claim as a mischaracterisation of Griffith’s account, arguing instead that 
                                                     
94 J.A.G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42(1) M.L.R. 1. 
95 Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42(1) M.L.R. 1, 16. 
96 Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42(1) M.L.R. 1, 19. 
97 See J. Allan, “Bills of Rights and Judicial Power – A Liberal’s Quandary” (1996) 16(2) O.J.L.S. 337, 345; R. 
Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.16. 
98 Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42(1) M.L.R. 1, 17. 
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Griffith saw Britain’s ‘political’ constitution as model constitution, underpinned by normative 
values.103   
 However, despite being conceived in the late 1970s, Griffith’s political constitution long 
lay dormant, and was not revived until after the implementation of the New Labour reform 
package of 1997.  Concerned by the apparent shift from a political constitution to a more legal 
one, writers such as Tomkins and Richard Bellamy took up Griffith’s mantle and sought to 
defend Britain’s political constitution, adopting a more explicit normative account couched in 
terms of civic republicanism, in particular Phillip Pettit’s egalitarian notion of “freedom as non-
domination”.104  Fundamental to “freedom as non-domination” is an understanding of 
democracy where “contestability takes the place of consent”105 and the people can challenge 
governmental actions.  Although emphasising the importance of democratic mechanisms of 
accountability,106 Pettit nevertheless argues that such mechanisms alone are insufficient in 
securing “freedom as non-domination”.  They must be accompanied by constitutional 
constraints in the form of rights-based constitutional review.107  Both Tomkins and Bellamy 
frame their normative readings of the political constitution in terms of civic republicanism, but 
both do so differently, although not incompatibly, and both depart from Pettit’s original thesis. 
 Tomkins believes the contemporary British constitution was forged in the late-seventeenth 
century around the convention of ministerial responsibility: “that the government is 
constitutionally responsible to Parliament”.108  Unlike Pettit, Tomkins objects to courts holding 
governments to account on the grounds that it is undemocratic, arguing that participation and 
access to the courts is limited, and that judges, being unelected and unrepresentative, are not 
as accountable as democratically-elected parliamentarians.109 
 Tomkins seeks to distinguish his account from Griffith’s, which he views as wholly 
descriptive in nature,110 by making his expressly normative.  The adoption of a legal 
constitution in Britain would be unwise, undemocratic, politically undesirable, and 
unconstitutional.111  This is the case, so he claims, because the political constitution is founded 
upon republican values, in particular Pettit’s understanding of “freedom as non-domination”.112  
Any interference with individual freedom must be by legitimate authority, which he defines as 
being contestable by those affected by it.113  For Tomkins, this legitimacy is secured under the 
British constitution because the government is accountable to Parliament, a forum where the 
people can contest the government’s actions.  This has the effect of giving normative force to 
                                                     
103 See T. Poole, “Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution” (2007) 70(2) M.L.R. 
250; G. Gee, ‘The political constitutionalism of J.A.G. Griffith’ (2008) 28(1) Legal Studies 20.  See also Gee and 
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104 See generally P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997). 
105 Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), p.ix. 
106 Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), pp.183-205. 
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the constitution’s system of political accountability, thus making it an “essential component in 
a constitutional structure designed to secure non-domination”.114 
 Both Griffith’s and Tomkins’ accounts of the political constitution, therefore, emphasise 
the prevention of abuse of power through political accountability.  Bellamy's account, though 
not precluding this check on power, instead focuses on the political constitution’s ability, 
through democracy, to harness power to achieve popular goals.115  In this sense, “the 
democratic process is the constitution”.116 
 Bellamy’s conception of the political constitution is similarly structured in opposition to 
what he views as the hallmark of the legal constitution: the entrenchment of human rights 
within a justiciable “higher law” constitution.117  Echoing Griffith, Bellamy opposes giving 
legal supremacy to any substantive values whatsoever on the grounds that people disagree on 
what set of outcomes a society committed to the democratic ideals of equality of concern and 
respect should achieve.118  Protecting values this way, Bellamy argues, does not guarantee 
Pettit’s republican, egalitarian understanding of “freedom as non-domination”, but instead 
undermines it, because judges are given leave to enforce universally their particular view of 
rights.119  The public can only ever be regarded as equal, Bellamy argues, when they participate 
in the democratic process,120 as it allows people's disagreements to be acknowledged and 
resolved without domination.  Bellamy notes, “the test of a political process is not so much that 
it generates outcomes we agree with as that it produces outcomes that all can agree to, on the 
grounds they are legitimate”.121 
 This is achieved, Bellamy argues, in three ways.  First, the system of “one person, one 
vote”, because “[i]t allows everyone to be counted equally and to accept the legitimacy of the 
view that prevails – even if they disagree with it”.122  Second, because a democratically-elected 
legislature reflects popular divisions in its membership, thus making unanimous agreement on 
issues unlikely, Bellamy identifies decisions by majority rule as the fairest method to resolve 
disputes between equally valid opinions.123  Third, Bellamy contends that legislation can be 
said to reflect the wishes and concerns of more than just the governing party’s supporters 
because of the “balance of power” principle, whereby rival centres of power, such as political 
parties in the legislature for example, are forced to recognise one another’s concerns and 
compromise.124   
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 In contrast to legal constitutionalism, therefore, political constitutionalism (as conceived 
by Griffith, Tomkins, and Bellamy) makes four closely-related claims.125  The first claim is that 
people disagree over what the substantive outcomes of a democratic society should be.  As a 
consequence, political constitutionalists dispute the existence of rights that are necessarily 
antecedent to democracy and thus deserving of legal entrenchment as part of a “higher law”.  
Unlike the legal constitution, therefore, the political constitution precludes the constitutional 
review of legislation.  The second claim is that democratic participation legitimises government 
because it best satisfies the egalitarian requirements of “freedom as non-domination”.  The 
necessary implication of these two claims combined, it is submitted, is the third claim: the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  If democratic participation forms the basis of legitimate 
government, and in the absence of a “higher law” from which the courts may review the 
constitutionality of legislative decisions, it stands to reason, that the legislature under the 
political constitution retains the final say on all matters.126  The fourth claim is that political 
accountability is more effective than the courts at preventing authoritarianism because 
politicians can be removed by the electorate at the ballot box, and because the survival of the 
government is dependent upon the support of Parliament.  The political constitution can be said 
to have a clear preference for political mechanisms of control over legal ones. 
 Although Griffith offered a largely descriptive account of the British constitution as a 
political constitution, he did not suggest that Britain had always been a political constitution.  
Tomkins’ work, by contrast, appears to suggest just that.  According to Tomkins, the 
foundations of the contemporary British constitution are found in the Glorious Revolution of 
the late-seventeenth century.  The structural makeup of the constitution therefore predates those 
adopted by countries a century later,127 thus explaining the constitution’s predisposition 
towards both parliamentary sovereignty and ministerial accountability, as well as the historical 
marginalisation of the courts in later centuries.128  For Tomkins, traditional English public law, 
between 1870 and 1970, was based on the political constitution,129 the height of Diceyan 
thinking.  This claim, however, appears dubious.  Although Dicey’s reading of parliamentary 
sovereignty remains intact under this new political paradigm, his essentially liberal 
justifications for it have now been replaced with republican ones.130  The political constitution, 
if anything, appears nothing more than a republican reinterpretation of the orthodox 
constitution. 
   Although many prominent political constitutionalists remain steadfast in their belief that 
much of the political constitution remains intact, untouched by recent reforms,131 Tomkins 
nevertheless suggests that Britain’s “old” political constitution no longer exists as it once did.  
After all, political constitutionalism was principally developed in response to a supposed shift 
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towards legal constitutionalism beginning in the 1970s and accelerating at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century.  Tomkins’ account is therefore arguably more normative than descriptive 
because he seeks to make the case for a change back to the old status quo: “the model of the 
political constitution is one that I seek not to invent but to revive”.132     
 Much like the common law constitution, both Griffith’s supposedly descriptive account, 
and Tomkins’ historical account, have arguably anchored the political constitution to the 
British system of government in such a way as to make the two indistinguishable.  However, 
because of the fact that the political constitution was developed as an alternative to legal 
constitutionalism broadly understood, and given express normative force by both Tomkins and 
Bellamy, it could also be viewed as a model of constitutional government which could be 
adopted by any nation.  It is not enough to say that the British constitution is a political one, 
but that it ought to be one also. 
 Building on this, Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber have sought to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the normative claims of political constitutionalism to draw a 
more effective comparison with legal constitutionalism.  They observe that political 
constitutionalism, unlike its rival, offers “no comparable, definitive prescriptions’ and is 
difficult to distinguish from ‘day-to-day political activity”.133  They thus conclude that although 
the political constitution is prescriptive in nature, these are minimal, stipulating only that 
political actors should “design an electoral process based on some notion of equal votes and to 
ensure that the political process is based on some notion of holding those in power to 
account”.134  Everything else, they claim, is for Parliament to decide.135       
 It is submitted, however, that whilst the political constitution is minimalistic in its 
prescriptions, these nevertheless go further than Gee and Webber claim.  Despite the universal 
rejection of “higher law” rights enforced by the courts, for instance, both Tomkins and Bellamy 
are nevertheless keen to stress that human rights themselves are compatible with political 
constitutionalism.136  It also stands to reason, it is submitted, that the political constitution 
necessitates conformity with the formal reading of the Rule of Law.137  In acknowledging the 
compatibility of human rights, both Tomkins and Bellamy also acknowledge a role for the 
courts in protecting them, albeit one which is circumscribed.138  The problem faced by political 
constitutionalism, therefore, is how best to accord respect for these values without undermining 
its three main claims and collapsing into a form of legal constitutionalism.   
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 Michael Gordon’s manner and form theory may provide a solution.  Building on Jennings’ 
work,139 Gordon argues that Parliament, though incapable of limiting its substantive powers, 
can nevertheless change the legislative process itself.  Parliament could therefore introduce 
procedural conditions on the passing of valid legislation, he argues, thus binding its successors 
as to the manner and form of legislation without diminishing its sovereignty.140  According to 
Gordon, recent challenges to parliamentary sovereignty, particularly Britain’s EU membership, 
necessitate a reassessment of the doctrine if it is to remain a fundamental characteristic of the 
British constitution.141  This reassessment includes an embracement of the manner and form 
theory, which he argues is consistent with parliamentary sovereignty and political 
constitutionalism, both of which are justifiable on democratic grounds.  As he notes, “just as it 
is democratic to allocate to Parliament the constitutional authority to legislate about any 
subject-matter, it is also democratic to allocate to Parliament the constitutional authority to 
legislate about the law-making process.”142  Crucially, Gordon argues that the manner and form 
theory could be used to develop Laws’ distinction between ordinary and constitutional 
statutes.143  Parliament, rather than the courts, would be at the forefront of this distinction, 
however, thus curtailing the development of common law constitutionalism,144 and bringing 
greater “coherence” to Britain’s political constitution.145  Indeed, if Parliament, rather than the 
courts, spearhead this distinction, granting greater statutory protection to rights for example, 
the decision would not only be more democratic, but also subject to political forms of 
accountability, including the electorate.146                  
 I have offered an alternative solution, however, in the form of constitutional 
conventions.147  Conventions are politically-binding rules of conduct incapable of judicial 
enforcement.  They are particularly attractive to political constitutionalism, therefore, because 
they can, through the threat of political sanctions, achieve limited government without judicial 
interference.  Respect for fundamental human rights and the Rule of Law are constitutional 
values embodied by what I have previously called latent conventions.  Such conventions 
influence the behaviour of politicians, but have not yet materialised into a recognised 
convention, and may not do so unless an attempt is made to subvert them. They therefore de 
facto limit Parliament’s powers, but in a manner consistent with the political constitution’s 
preference for political over legal mechanisms of accountability.148 
 
Complementary constitutionalism 
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The debate surrounding the nature of the contemporary constitution has been characterised as 
one of law versus politics, thus making it bipolar: the legal constitution (including the common 
law) against the political constitution.  The former wants greater legal constraints on 
government, whilst the latter prefers political ones.  No-one is guiltier of this polarisation than 
the architects and advocates of each school who, in defence of their viewpoint, tend to present 
“a stark choice between either a legal constitution or a political constitution – but not both”, 
thereby presenting the debate on constitutionalism in an “all-encompassing” manner.149 
 It is submitted, however, that a view of only one model as the true picture of the British 
constitution, will always be incomplete.  The models proposed, each reflective of wider 
concerns over the governance of the British state, seek to bring order to the chaos that is the 
British constitution.  However, the sprawling nature of the British constitution, with roots 
stretching back to time-immemorial spanning several nations, is too much for any single model 
to capture in its entirety.  The true face of the constitution, it is submitted, will only ever come 
into focus once we accept it as fusion of all three. 
 There is some recognition by academics that the British constitution is a mixture of both 
legal and political constitutions.  Gee and Webber, for example, have noted that “Britain's 
constitution today embraces, perhaps in uncertain ways and to an uncertain extent, both a 
political model and a legal model”.150  This recognition extends even to advocates of each 
competing model of constitutionalism.  Trevor Allan and Tom Hickman, for example, have 
expressed a clear desire to reconcile the differences between the two schools,151 whilst Adam 
Tomkins and Richard Bellamy have conceded that elements of both the legal and the political 
schools exist under the same constitution.152   
 Recognition aside, however, few have sought to offer a full account of Britain’s “mixed 
constitution”.153  Given that many accounts are normative in nature, and therefore seek, not to 
offer an account of the constitution as it is, but instead of what the constitution should be, their 
reluctance to articulate a full account of the “mixed constitution” is unsurprising.  Even where 
partial accounts are offered, they are, as Gee and Webber note, likely to provide an unreliable 
picture of Britain's “mixed constitution”, informed by the preferred model of their authors.154  
This is the case even with some explicit reconciliatory models of constitutionalism, in 
particular Steven Garbaum’s new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism,155 which 
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encompass ‘dialogical’ or ‘third wave’ bills of rights like the Human Rights Act 1998,156 as 
well as bi-polar sovereignty as developed by Sir Stephen Sedley157 and Christopher Knight.158  
Although such theories should be praised for seeking to break the traditional dichotomy 
between law and politics, it is arguable that the former merely preserves political 
constitutionalism, whilst the latter collapses into common law constitutionalism, thus 
undermining the reconciliation.   
 Articulating Britain’s mixed constitution in its entirety is a monumental task which will be 
explored in greater detail elsewhere.  For the purposes of this article, however, a brief account 
of Britain’s mixed constitution will be made. 
 Both the common law and the political models of constitutionalism seek to reinterpret the 
existing constitution, and do so by adopting both principled as well as historical perspectives.  
The common law constitution, like the legal constitution, is founded upon liberal values, and 
therefore seeks to read into the common law these values in order to accord them protection in 
the absence of a codified and entrenched constitution.  It looks to the case law of the 
seventeenth century and the idea of the “ancient constitution” as evidence of the common law’s 
natural affinity with these liberal values, as well as legislation’s inherent dependency upon 
interpretation by the common law courts for its primacy within the constitution.  The political 
constitution according to Tomkins and Bellamy, by contrast, is based upon republican ideals.  
It thus views the British constitution’s traditional orientation around Parliament and political 
accountability, originating (it claims) from Parliament’s victory over the Crown in the 
seventeenth century, as the optimal embodiment of these ideals, and empirical evidence of the 
constitution being an inherently political one.  The common law and political constitutions are, 
in their own ways, de facto defences of the pre-existing constitution.  Both view the constitution 
differently in light of their own preferred principles, each looking to history for support. 159  
Neither argue for sweeping reform of the constitution, but instead seek only to preserve the 
status quo as they see it.  As rival historical reinterpretations, therefore, both are prima facie 
adversarial and polarised in nature.  It is submitted, however, that evidence of both models can 
be found under the contemporary British constitution, and that the differences between the 
models are more nuanced than is often credited, with disagreement between them being one 
primarily of degree.   
 Common law systems operate in much of Britain, and in the sphere of public law at least, 
the English common law, dating back to the twelfth century, extends to the whole of the UK.  
It is undisputable that the common law, as developed by judges, is the source of many 
constitutional rules and principles.  It is also true to say that legislation, despite being passed 
by a sovereign Parliament, is subject to interpretation by judges under the common law.  
Executive action, including action under the royal prerogative, is also subject to review by the 
courts according to common law principles, thus suggesting that the ultra vires model of review 
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does not adequately explain Britain’s system of judicial review.  If anything, the ultra vires 
model of review can only partially explain the ability of judges to review executive action.  
This demonstrates that the common law, to some degree at least, constitutes a restriction on 
governmental power independent of Parliament.     
 Recognition of these facts, however, does not necessarily mean that Britain possesses a 
common law constitution over a political one.  The ultra vires model of review does explain 
why the courts were able to review governmental action in many cases, thus further 
demonstrating the centrality of parliamentary sovereignty to the contemporary British 
constitution, one of the hallmarks of the political constitution.  Judicial recognition of this 
principle, although important to its acceptance, should not be assumed to be at the sole 
discretion of the courts.  As Jeffrey Goldsworthy has noted, “the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is constituted by a consensus among the senior officials of all branches of 
government.  It was not … made by the judges alone”.160  Political reality, shaped by historical 
and contemporary events, also gives force to the principle, thus compelling judicial recognition 
of it.  The courts have continually recognised parliamentary sovereignty as a fundamental 
constitutional principle,161 and on several occasions have also said that they will even enforce 
Parliament’s intention to abrogate rights where express words to that effect are used in an Act 
of Parliament.162  Parliament itself is equally capable of altering the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy, and has arguably done so on multiple occasions already, most notably with the 
ECA 1972.  The British constitution also continues to rely heavily on political checks by both 
Parliament and the electorate, with constitutional conventions remaining a defining 
characteristic of the constitution.163 
 Similarly, however, adherence to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and a 
dependency upon political checks does not necessarily mean that Britain possesses a political 
constitution over a common law one.  As shown above, the common law does not preclude 
parliamentary sovereignty absolutely, nor does the political constitution reject outright the 
notion of fundamental human rights or the role of the courts in protecting them, even against a 
sovereign legislature. 
 It can be seen, therefore, that both models of constitutionalism have shared characteristics, 
demonstrating common ground between the two.  Both models merely give a different 
emphasis to these shared characteristics, thus resulting in them offering a different answer to 
the question of what the appropriate balance between law and politics should be.  This 
manifests itself as an answer to the question of who should have the final say in hard cases.  
The common law model favours the courts under the common law, whilst the political 
constitution favours politics as embodied by Parliament.   
 However, in trying to answer the question of where the appropriate line between law and 
politics should lie, it is submitted that both models offer an incomplete answer.  There is 
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common ground between the two, and both the common law and political model are the product 
of Britain’s evolved constitution, each focussing on different but equally valid constitutional 
traits.  On this reading, Britain can be seen to possess both a common law and a political 
constitution.  The claims of both models, therefore, cannot be reasonably dismissed outright, 
irrespective of the normative arguments, and neither model should be seen as being dominant 
as of right.  The common law and political constitutions are two sides of the same coin, where 
neither is complete without the other.  The relationship between the two should therefore be 
seen as complementary rather than contradictory in nature.  Both models should be used in a 
manner which supports and sustains each other in order to achieve better government 
accountability than either could alone achieve, thus resulting in a more balanced constitution, 
what this article calls complementary constitutionalism.164   
 It is legitimate for Parliament to expect that its enactments will be enforced by the courts 
by virtue of its democratic basis.  Judicial enforcement, however, is likewise legitimately 
conditional on Parliament’s enactments being in conformity with common law principles.  In 
the same way that the courts should recognise and respect the democratic legitimacy of 
Parliament, so too should Parliament recognise and respect the rule of law embodied by the 
common law.  Both should perform their functions with the role of the other in mind, and where 
possible mitigate or avoid potential conflict with the other.  Consequently, although Parliament 
can pass any law whatsoever, it should refrain from undermining the Rule of Law.  Similarly, 
the courts, although capable of interpreting legislation in light of the Rule of Law, should do 
so in a way which respects Parliament’s wishes, and refrain from invalidating an Act wherever 
possible.        
 Hard cases may of course arise which bring the models into conflict, with both Parliament 
and the courts seeking to have the final say.  To date, the courts have never invalidated an Act 
of Parliament.  This does not mean, however, that the courts will never invalidate an Act of 
Parliament, or that they would be acting inappropriately if they did.  Hard cases are by 
definition exceptional and rare, and should not be used as the basis on which to characterise 
the entire constitutional system.  Should the courts one day invalidate an Act of Parliament in 
circumstances envisaged by Allan above, this should not necessarily signal the end of 
Parliamentary sovereignty as a key principle of the British constitution, or the subservience of 
the political constitution to the common law constitution.  In every other respect, and in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, Parliament would still be free to legislate unimpeded.  
Likewise, should the courts decide not invalidate, this does not mean that the common law 
ceases to be important in the interpretation of other statutes.  Determining who should win in 
hard cases is no easy task, and should be dependent upon the circumstances of each case.  In 
some situations, the Rule of Law may need to give way to parliamentary sovereignty, whilst in 
others the converse may be true.  The exact line between law and politics, between the courts 
and Parliament, is therefore necessarily indeterminate.  Any strict rule will ultimately favour 
one side over the other, thus inevitably resulting in injustice in some cases. 
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 However, when comparing the British constitution to other world constitutions, in 
particular those with a codified and entrenched constitution, it is clear that the British 
constitution favours political control over legal ones.  That is to say, the British constitution 
reserves certain matters for politics that a legal constitution would otherwise reserve for law.  
On this basis, it would be accurate to describe the British constitution as primarily or 
predominantly political in nature,165 but this fact does not, and should not, create the impression 
that it is any less dependent on the common law as outlined above.  
 Legal constitutionalism, of course, offers something distinct from both the common law 
and political models.  As Blick observes, “written constitution” is a term which “implies an act 
of conception through language”.166  Developed in opposition to the British constitution, it 
offers an alternative which ultimately seeks to displace it.  Should Britain eventually adopt a 
codified, entrenched constitution, everything would potentially be subject to debate, and more 
than just the balance of power between Parliament and the courts would have to be decided.  
The adoption of a legal constitution, therefore, would represent a new beginning for the British 
constitution, thus marking a break with its historical continuity.  It is submitted, however, that 
this fact should not exclude the legal constitution from any reconciliation, nor should its 
adoption be seen to negate any attempt at reconciliation.  Whilst the adoption of a fully codified, 
entrenched constitution would mark a sharp departure from British constitutional history, the 
same would not be true where it is adopted, not in whole, but in part. 
 There is great value in the British constitution’s evolutionary common law nature, which 
should not be easily dismissed in favour of an all-encompassing written constitution.167  In the 
same way that legislation has been used to augment the constitution and assist its evolution, so 
too can codified, entrenched law.  Legal constitutionalism can be used sparingly to help 
supplement Britain’s otherwise evolved constitution for those areas  for which both the political 
and the common law models are unable to provide adequate solutions.  Legal constitutionalism 
is inherently broad in its scope because the process of adopting a constitution necessitates 
design decisions.  All matters contained within the constitution, not just fundamental rights, 
would have ‘higher law’ status.  The creation, composition and powers of institutions of 
government, for example, are often contained within legal constitutions.    
 Consequently, although many will look to the protection of fundamental human rights as 
one area where the British constitution may benefit from greater legal constitutionalism, it is 
submitted that for a more complementary, and thus balanced use of legal constitutionalism, it 
should be reserved for matters of broad constitutional design, most notably the Union itself.  
Minimalist legal constitutionalism, on matters of broad state structure, could help bring greater 
clarity and legitimacy in the wake of both the EU and Scottish independence referendums.  This 
idea is also not new to Britain, and some have sought to argue that the 1707 Treaty is a de facto 
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constitution.168  If so, it is a minimalist, partial constitution, supplemented both by the common 
law and political constitutions.   
 Although the introduction of legal constitutionalism in the form of codified, entrenched 
law would necessitate judicial enforcement (thus diminishing parliamentary sovereignty in real 
terms), this should not be seen as a great departure from Britain’s orthodox constitution.  
Parliament could still legislate on other matters, including fundamental rights.  Unlike human 
rights, which are often wide in their scope and highly contestable, the demarcation of 
competences between Westminster and the devolved bodies, although complex, is narrower in 
focus.  As a result, judicial interference with political decisions would likely be minimal.  
Britain could be a “mixed constitution” which is predominantly political in nature, but 
supplemented by both common law and legal constitutionalism. 
 It is clear therefore that it is only when all three models of constitutionalism are taken 
together that a truer image of the constitution appears, and a path towards a more stable 
constitutional future for Britain emerges.  However, if and until we embrace complementary 
constitutionalism, contestability will remain the defining characteristic of the British 
constitution.  Whether the British constitution can survive such contestability much longer 
remains to be seen. 
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